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Violence and Risk Preference: 
Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan†
By Michael Callen, Mohammad Isaqzadeh, James D. Long, 
and Charles Sprenger*
We investigate the relationship between violence and economic risk 
preferences in Afghanistan combining: (i) a two-part experimental 
procedure identifying risk preferences, violations of Expected Utility, 
and specific preferences for certainty; (ii) controlled recollection of 
fear based on established methods from psychology; and (iii) admin-
istrative violence data from precisely geocoded military records. We 
document a specific preference for certainty in violation of Expected 
Utility. The preference for certainty, which we term a Certainty 
Premium, is exacerbated by the combination of violent exposure 
and controlled fearful recollections. The results have implications 
for risk taking and are potentially actionable for policymakers and 
 marketers. (JEL A12, C91, D12, D74, D81, O12, O17)
Documenting and understanding the effects of trauma lie primarily in the medi-
cal and psychiatric fields. Clinicians recognize that exposure to trauma can have 
complex and lasting effects on mental and physical health (Boscarino 2006; Yehuda 
2002; Kessler et al. 1995), with additional consequences for  socioeconomic out-
comes (Brunello et al. 2001).1 Given the volume of trauma-affected individuals, 
there is reason to study the economic effects of trauma both for the design of policy 
and for delivering greater insight into decision making.
1 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is estimated to affect 5–6 percent of men and 10–14 percent of women 
in the United States at some point during their lives (Kessler et al. 1995; Yehuda 2002). Estimates from the National 
Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Survey indicate that the lifetime PTSD prevalence for veterans is much higher, 
30.9 percent for males and 26.9 percent for females (Schlenger et al. 1992). The disorder is linked to depression, gen-
eralized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, substance abuse, and health conditions including hypertension, asthma, and 
chronic pain syndrome (Kessler et al. 1995; Yehuda 2002). Comorbidity studies suggest that trauma leads to severe 
economic consequences related to psychiatric, psychosocial, and occupational impairments (Brunello et al. 2001).
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Research in economics and psychology points to a potential relationship between 
trauma and the economic risk preferences central to decision making. Early life 
financial experiences such as the Great Depression are linked to more conservative 
later life investing behavior (Malmendier and Nagel 2011), potentially suggesting 
an increase in risk aversion.2 Artefactual field experiments from zones of natural 
disaster or conflict also suggest that exposed individuals’ risk preferences are altered 
(Eckel, Gamal, and Wilson 2009; Voors et al. 2012; Cameron and Shah 2010; Cassar, 
Healy, and von Kessler 2011).3 Though causality is difficult to establish—issues of 
mobility and selective migration present natural confounds—and a central stylized 
fact has yet to appear, such studies compellingly suggest that exposed individuals 
have their risk preferences lastingly changed.4
Psychology has taken a laboratory approach to investigating the relationship 
between trauma and risk. Though trauma cannot be experimentally adminis-
tered, it can be experimentally recalled. Fitting into a broader agenda linking 
induced positive and negative affect to decision making (Isen and Geva 1987; 
Johnson and Tversky 1983; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004; Slovic and 
Peters 2006), one priming mechanism employed in the literature has been the 
controlled recollection of the fear associated with potentially traumatic episodes 
(Lerner and Keitner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003).5 These recollections induce fear 
in self-reports (Lerner and Keitner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003) and have startling 
effects on decision making under uncertainty. Fearful recollections induce more 
pessimistic likelihood judgements, and, in related studies, self-reported fear cor-
relates with risk-averse choices in famous decisions such as the “Asian disease 
problem” (Lerner and Keitner 2001, Study 1).
In this paper, we combine three tools from psychology and economics to analyze 
the relationship between potentially traumatic experiences and risk preferences. 
First, we introduce an experimental procedure based on the uncertainty equivalents 
of Andreoni and Sprenger (2011), hypothetically eliciting risk preferences both 
at and away from certainty.6 Second, we conduct our experiments in Afghanistan, 
a nation with widespread exposure to violence, on a sample of 1,127 Afghan 
2 A clear alternative, however, is that such experiences change beliefs about the process of returns. See 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) for further discussion. Such evidence relates closely to genetic evidence indicating 
that though some heritability in risk preferences and financial behavior is observed, much of the variation remains 
unexplained (Cesarini et al. 2009, 2010; Kuhnen, Samanez-Larkin, and Knutson 2011).
3 While Eckel, Gamal, and Wilson (2009) and Voors et al. (2012) demonstrate increased risk tolerance after 
Hurricane Katrina and civil conflict in Burundi, Cameron and Shah (2010) and Cassar, Healy, and von Kessler 
(2011) demonstrate increased risk aversion after exposure to natural disasters.
4 Eckel, Gamal, and Wilson (2009) note that changed risk preferences appear to attenuate within one year, while 
Cameron and Shah (2010) document effects up to nine years after exposure. Sustained change in fundamental 
economic decision making carries the implication that economic consequences of broad-based exposure to trauma 
may be extremely large.
5 For example, after September 11th, 2001, Lerner et al. (2003) ask “The terrorist attacks evoked a lot of emotion 
in Americans. We are particularly interested in what makes you most AFRAID about the attacks. Please describe 
in detail the one thing that makes you most AFRAID about the attacks. Write as detailed a description of that thing 
as possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even get AFRAID from learning 
about the situation.”
6 Methods like the uncertainty equivalent were discussed in Farquhar’s (1984) excellent survey of utility assess-
ment methods and were implemented experimentally in one study of nine subjects using hypothetical monetary 
rewards (McCord and de Neufville 1986), and a number of medical questionnaires (Magat, Viscusi, and Huber 
1996; Oliver 2005, 2007; Bleichrodt et al. 2007).
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 civilians.7 We have access to detailed data on Afghanistan’s violent incidents from 
the International Security Assistance Force, with precise geocoded locations and 
timestamps of both successful and failed insurgent attacks. Third, we deploy in the 
field psychological methods that randomize the controlled recollection of fearful 
episodes. The design allows administrative and experimental data to be combined so 
that violence-affected and unaffected individuals can be compared with and without 
experimental primes. This may provide the necessary machinery to speak to the 
permanence of the effects of trauma on risk preferences and the potential triggering 
of specific risk-taking behaviors.
We document substantial differences between utility elicited under uncertainty 
and utility elicited under certainty. Individuals are systematically more risk averse 
under certainty compared to uncertainty. This baseline finding is in contradiction 
to Expected Utility, indicating a specific preference for certainty, which we term a 
Certainty Premium. Interestingly, the Certainty Premium is exacerbated by recol-
lection of fearful events. A similar investigation of our administrative data indicates 
limited correlation between experimentally elicited preferences and administrative 
violence records. When exploring the interaction between violence and fear, we find 
the effects of fearful recollections are localized to those who have experienced vio-
lence. Fearful recollections trigger changes in risk and certainty preferences specifi-
cally for those individuals exposed to violence. The results are robust to a variety of 
alternate specifications exploiting only within-location variation, using self-reports 
of victimization and exploring issues of selective migration, social cohesion, and 
changing definitions and vintages of violence.
We point to two central implications of these findings. First, our data speak to the 
permanence of traumatic exposure’s influence on risk preference.  Violence-exposed 
individuals may be altered, but it is the susceptibility of their behavior to priming 
triggers that is altered, not their risk preferences, per se. Second, if a specific pat-
tern of behavior can be triggered for violence-exposed individuals, then this infor-
mation is potentially actionable by both marketers and policymakers in product 
design and policy intervention.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I presents our design combining utility 
elicitation procedures, priming mechanisms borrowed from psychology, and objec-
tive violence data. Section II presents results, and Section III provides a discussion 
and conclusion.
I. Research Design
We describe our research design exploring exposure to violence and risk prefer-
ences in three subsections. First, we present our utility elicitation device. Second, 
we discuss priming methods borrowed from psychology, manipulating trau-
matic recollections. Third, we present our violence data obtained from objective 
military records.
7 In 2007, 1,523 civilian deaths were recorded in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2008). This number increased to 2,118 
in 2008, 2,415 in 2009 and 2,777 in 2010 (UNAMA 2010). During this period, instability has spread from the south 
to the northern, eastern, and western regions of the country such that Afghans throughout the country have become 
exposed to violence.
AQ 2
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A. Utility Elicitation
Researchers have long been interested in eliciting utility and measuring risk 
aversion. A key contribution from experimental economics is the risk preference 
elicitation of Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects make a series of decisions between 
Option A, a safe binary gamble, and Option B, a risky binary gamble with more 
variable outcomes. As subjects proceed, the probability of the high outcome in 
each gamble moves from zero to one, such that the difference in expected value, 
EV(A) − EV(B), moves from positive to negative. Where a subject switches from 
preferring Option A to Option B carries interval information on his risk aversion. 
Resulting choices are often used to infer a parametric measure of risk aversion. 
That is, Expected Utility (EU) is imposed, a functional form for utility is assumed, 
and the shape of the utility function is calculated or estimated at either the group or 
individual level. Harrison and RutstrÖm (2008) provide a detailed summary of the 
estimation exercises associated with the Holt and Laury (2002) and similar tasks, 
such as those employed in the study of trauma (Voors et al. 2012; Eckel, Gamal, 
and Wilson 2009; Cameron and Shah 2010; Cassar, Healy, and von Kessler 2011).8
A potential difficulty in parametrically identifying utility values lies in the validity 
of the underlying EU assumptions. Particular attention should be given to the inde-
pendence axiom and its implication of linearity-in-probabilities. Beginning with the 
Allais (1953) common-ratio and common-consequence paradoxes, research consis-
tently demonstrates failures of linearity-in-probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Tversky and Fox 1995), particularly in deci-
sions involving certainty (Conlisk 1989; Camerer 1992; Harless and Camerer 1994; 
Starmer 2000). Behavioral decision theories accounting for these so-called “cer-
tainty effects” have arisen, including Cumulative Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), Disappointment Aversion (Bell 1985; 
Loomes and Sugden 1986; Gul 1991), and u–v preferences (Neilson 1992; Schmidt 
1998; Diecidue, Schmidt, and Wakker 2004). Under these models, behavior in Holt 
and Laury (2002) tasks as well as those employed by Voors et al. (2012), Eckel, 
Gamal, and Wilson (2009), and Cameron and Shah (2010) is not attributable to util-
ity function curvature alone. Hence, one cannot make unconfounded inference with 
respect to the relationship between trauma and risk preferences.
We introduce experimental methodology designed to elicit risk preferences, and 
to test the predictions of EU and competing behavioral models designed to accom-
modate certainty effects. The task is a field-ready, two-question modification of 
the uncertainty equivalent presented in Andreoni and Sprenger (2011). Similar to 
the Holt and Laury (2002) task, subjects make a series of choices between a rela-
tively safe Option A and a relatively risky Option B. However, in our task Option 
A is always a ( p, 1 − p) gamble over X and Y > X, ( p; X, Y ). The uncertainty 
8 Cassar, Healy, and von Kessler (2011) implement four Holt and Laury (2002) tasks. Distinctions exist between 
the other implemented methods and the Holt and Laury (2002) task. Certainty does not play a role in the Holt and 
Laury (2002) task as individuals, with the exception of the last row, are always choosing between positive variance 
gambles. In Eckel, Gamal, and Wilson (2009) and Cameron and Shah (2010) individuals make a choice between 
six binary gambles, one of which pays the same in both states. Voors et al. (2012) implement a variant of a task 
implemented in Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund (2010) where individuals make six choices between a changing 
certain amount and a 30 percent–70 percent gamble over a high outcome and zero.
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 equivalent identifies the (q, 1 − q) gamble over Y and 0, (q; Y, 0), that generates 
indifference by having Option B be a series of gambles, increasing in expected 
value, over Y and 0. Where a subject switches from preferring Option A to Option B 
carries interval information on his uncertainty equivalent, q. The method draws its 
motivation from the textbook treatment of expected utility, where the cardinal index 
for a gamble is derived as the probability mixture over the best and worst options in 
the space of gambles.9 The elicited q in (q; Y, 0) can be interpreted as a utility index 
for ( p; X, Y ) and can be used as a measure of risk aversion.
Task 1: Eliciting Utility under Uncertainty.—In Task 1, we fix p = 0.5. Under 
the EU framework, the uncertainty equivalent establishes the indifference condition
 0.5 · v(X ) + 0.5 · v(Y ) = q · v(Y ) + (1 − q) · v(0).
As EU is unique up to an affine transformation, we fix the values v(0) = 0 and 
v(Y ) = 1 and rearrange to obtain the utility of X,
(1) v(X  ) U ≡  
q − 0.5
 _
0.5
  ,
where the U subscript refers to the utility being elicited under uncertainty. Note that 
v(X  ) U can be compared to a risk-neutral level, X/Y. A risk-neutral individual will 
exhibit v(X  ) U = X/Y, a risk-averse individual will exhibit v(X  ) U > X/Y, and a risk-
loving individual will exhibit v(X  ) U < X/Y. This is a nonparametric measure of risk 
aversion as v(X  ) U values can be compared across individuals, but no assumptions 
are necessary for utility’s functional form.
Task 2: Eliciting Utility under Certainty.—In Task 2, we fix p = 1. Again, under 
the EU framework the uncertainty equivalent establishes the indifference condition
 v(X ) =  q′ · v(Y ) + (1 −  q′ ) · v(0).
We make the EU substitutions v(0) = 0 and v(Y ) = 1 to obtain
(2) v(X  ) C ≡  q′ ,
where the C subscript refers to the utility being elicited under certainty. This utility 
value again acts as a nonparametric measure of risk aversion.
Importantly, EU’s prediction of linearity-in-probabilities implies the equality
 v(X  ) U = v(X  ) C 
will hold. This is a critical prediction of EU’s independence axiom testable in the 
uncertainty equivalent environment.
9 See, e.g., Varian (1992).
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Alternative Preference Models.—Alternative preference models such as 
Cumulative Prospect Theory, Disappointment Aversion, and u–v preferences make 
differing  predictions in uncertainty equivalents (Andreoni and Sprenger 2011). In our 
environment, these arguments reduce to sign predictions for the inequality between 
v(X  ) U and v(X  ) C . We define the signed distance between the two as
(3) Certaint y Premium ≡ v(X  ) C − v(X  ) U .
Note that the Certainty Premium, v(X  ) C − v(X  ) U , is defined in probability units of 
the high outcome, Y, such that one can refer to certainty of X being worth a specific 
percent chance of Y relative to its uncertain value. Of course, EU predicts Certainty 
Premium = 0. To preview the results, we present the following predictions:
 (i) Cumulative Prospect Theory predicts v(X  ) C < v(X  ) U or Certainty 
Premium < 0 ;
 (ii) Disappointment Aversion and u–v preferences predict v(X  ) C > v(X  ) U or 
Certainty Premium > 0.
To clarify the first prediction, we note that Cumulative Prospect Theory attributes 
violations of EU to a nonlinear probability weighting scheme.10 In the popularized 
version of the model considered here, it is argued that individuals “edit” probabili-
ties, up-weighting low probabilities and down-weighting high probabilities, giving 
rise to an inverted S-shaped transformation, π( p). In Cumulative Prospect Theory, 
decision weights are applied to the higher outcome of a binary gamble and prob-
abilities zero and one are unweighted. Identifying the S-shape of the weighting func-
tion and determining its parameter values has received significant attention (Wu and 
Gonzalez 1996; Prelec 1998; Gonzalez and Wu 1999; Abdellaoui 2000).
As the literature has followed a primarily parametric path, we consider one form 
for Cumulative Prospect Theory popularized by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 
π( p) =  p γ /(  p γ + (1 − p ) γ ) 1/γ , 0 < γ < 1, where γ represents the intensity of 
probability weighting. For ease of exposition and to foreshadow our implementa-
tion, we assume linear utility, X = 1, and Y = 3, and the Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) estimate of  ˆ  γ = 0.61 such that the Cumulative Prospect Theory indifference 
condition in Task 1 is written
 (1 − π (0.5)) · 1 + π (0.5) · 3 = π (q) · 3 + (1 − π(q)) · 0.
We solve for v(X  ) U as
 v(X  ) U =  
 π −1 ( (1 − π (0.5)) · 1 + π (0.5) · 3  __ 
3
  ) − 0.5
   ___ 
0.5
  =  
0.81 − 0.5
 _
0.5
  = 0.62,
10 We abstract away from loss aversion around a fixed reference point that is part of the Cumulative Prospect 
Theory formulation. Further, we consider only one formulation of the nonlinear probability weighting, S-shaped 
probability distortions. Cumulative Prospect Theory can accommodate other versions of nonlinearity in probability 
including globally convex and globally concave distortions. Note these alternative formulations will not yield the 
same predictions as those developed here.
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which can be compared to the risk-neutral level X/Y = 1/3 such that Cumulative 
Prospect Theory predicts risk aversion, v(X  ) U > X/Y, under uncertainty.
11
Interestingly, the risk-aversion prediction above is not maintained under certainty. 
Note that in Task 2 under our assumed forms, the Cumulative Prospect Theory indif-
ference condition is written
 1 = π( q′ ) · 3.
Hence,
 v(X  ) C =  π 
−1  ( 1 _ 3 ) .
Importantly, under most functional forms for π( · ) considered in the literature, 
probabilities are neither up-weighted nor down-weighted for probabilities around 
1/3. Hence, near risk neutrality should be expected. Indeed, under the Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) weights, we predict v(X  ) C = 0.33 such that under common func-
tional forms and parameter values for Cumulative Prospect Theory
 v(X  ) C < v(X  ) U ; Certaint y  Premium < 0.
The prediction from Cumulative Prospect Theory is in contrast to the predic-
tion for Disappointment Aversion and u–v preferences. These models both feature 
specific preferences for certainty in order to accommodate certainty effects. Under 
disappointment-averse preferences, the prospect of losses is eliminated at certainty, 
leading certainty to be preferred. Under u–v preferences, certainty per se yields a 
utility boost. Though in a richer environment such as that presented in Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2011) the two models can be distinguished, in the present environment 
they both generate the prediction that utility under certainty is greater than utility 
under uncertainty,
 v(X  ) C > v(X  ) U ; Certaint y Pr emium > 0.
With our modified two-task uncertainty equivalent, we are able to provide mea-
sures of risk aversion as well as test for violations of EU, provide some separation 
between competing non-EU decision theories, and generate a measure of the prefer-
ence for certainty, Certainty Premium.
Implementation and Protocol.—Two uncertainty equivalent tasks were designed. 
These experimental tasks were placed in fixed order, Task 2 then Task 1, in a broad 
survey of household experiences, attitudes, and beliefs, administered to 2,027 respon-
dents in 12 of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial centers from December 18–27, 2010.
In each task, subjects made a series of ten decisions between Option A, a fixed 
( p; X, Y ) gamble, and Option B, a changing (q; Y, 0) gamble. The probability, 
q, increased from 0.1 to 1 through a task. The values of X and Y were chosen to be 150 
11 Indeed, for all γ < 1 this relationship is maintained. Andreoni and Sprenger (2011) provide more detailed 
discussion as well as model predictions without appeal to specific functional forms and parameter values.
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and 450 Afghanis, respectively, corresponding to around one and three days’ wages 
in provincial centers (National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2005, 2007).
Table 1 provides the multiple price lists as they appeared, translated into English.12 
Where an individual switches from Option A to Option B in each task carries inter-
val information on his uncertainty equivalent, and so the utility values, v(X  ) U and 
v(X  ) C , and their Certainty Premium.
The primary sampling unit for our survey was polling centers open on election day, 
September 18, 2010, and deemed secure at that time by the International Security 
Assistance Force and by the Afghan National Police. These polling centers were 
generally neighborhood landmarks such as mosques, schools, or markets. Our sur-
veys were conducted three months after the election, between December 18 and 27, 
2010. Enumerators were told to begin at the polling center and survey either six or 
eight subjects. Surveys were conducted in individuals’ homes. Enumerators adhered 
to the right-hand rule random selection method and respondents within houses were 
selected according to a Kish grid (Kish 1949). Keeping with Afghan custom, men 
and women were interviewed by field staff of their own gender.
Critical to implementing surveys and experiments with nonstandard subject pools, 
particularly in zones of conflict, are cultural differences, enumerator training, and sub-
ject comprehension. One of our largest worries in design was the potential sensitivity of 
questions involving risk in a predominantly Muslim country. For this reason, we opted 
to administer the questions only in 12 less conservative provinces of Badakhshan, 
12 The language of experimentation, Dari, reads right to left such that the reading of the task may have differed 
from standard populations. Enumerators were told to describe each question in turn as a choice between Option A 
and Option B. Online Appendix Figure A1 shows the original instruments.
Table 1—Multiple Price Lists
q′ ∈ Option B Option A
Task 1
[0, 0.1] 10% chance of 450 Afs, 90% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.1, 0.2] 20% chance of 450 Afs, 80% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.2, 0.3] 30% chance of 450 Afs, 70% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.3, 0.4] 40% chance of 450 Afs, 60% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.4, 0.5] 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.5, 0.6] 60% chance of 450 Afs, 40% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.6, 0.7] 70% chance of 450 Afs, 30% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.7, 0.8] 80% chance of 450 Afs, 20% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.8, 0.9] 90% chance of 450 Afs, 10% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs
[0.9, 1] 100% chance of 450 Afs, 0% chance of 0 Afs 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 150 Afs 
q ∈
Task 2
[0, 0.1] 10% chance of 450 Afs, 90% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.1, 0.2] 20% chance of 450 Afs, 80% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.2, 0.3] 30% chance of 450 Afs, 70% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.3, 0.4] 40% chance of 450 Afs, 60% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.4, 0.5] 50% chance of 450 Afs, 50% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.5, 0.6] 60% chance of 450 Afs, 40% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.6, 0.7] 70% chance of 450 Afs, 30% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.7, 0.8] 80% chance of 450 Afs, 20% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.8, 0.9] 90% chance of 450 Afs, 10% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
[0.9, 1] 100% chance of 450 Afs, 0% chance of 0 Afs 150 Afghanis
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Balkh, Bamyan, Daikondi, Faryab, Herat, Juzjan, Kabul, Kapisa, Panjshir, Parwan, 
and Samangan. Additionally, we had our interviewers read a fixed informed con-
sent script, asking individuals if they were willing to answer a few questions about 
uncertain outcomes.13 Of the 2,027 respondents contacted, only 1,127 respondents 
consented to participate in the experimental component of the survey. Respondents 
therefore are from 278 polling center precincts. Of these 1,127 respondents 977 com-
pleted both Task 1 and Task 2. Attrition from the experiment is discussed in detail in 
Subsection IIC. As in most consented experiments where respondents are allowed 
to select out, we naturally cannot claim that our sample is representative even of the 
nonrepresentatively selected neighborhoods where the survey took place. Hence, the 
treatment effects presented here should be thought of as those for the sample at hand 
and care should be taken when extrapolating to other environments.
A second major concern was the use of incentivized methods and safety. We chose 
to use hypothetical tasks as we determined, in collaboration with our field staff, 
that it was too dangerous for our survey enumerators to carry substantial sums on 
the street and were particularly worried about the potential for conflicts between 
respondents in the same neighborhood receiving different amounts. Though we can-
not be sure of any potential bias induced by this choice, it clearly suggests the need 
for further research with incentivized payments. Importantly, we can compare the 
hypothetical responses of our subjects with the incentivized responses of Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2011) for qualitative differences in behavior.
A total of 247 enumerators were trained in the experimental methods in a series 
of four training sessions. These sessions provided enumerators with a script for 
explaining the tasks and a mechanism for visualizing the gambles for subjects.14
Additionally, the 38 survey supervisors for the project trained for two days with the 
authors, receiving both translated instruction from the US authors and direct instruc-
tion in Dari from the Afghan author. Before deploying to the field, both supervisors 
and enumerators also carried out group mock elicitations to ensure proper explanation.
One potential way of measuring miscomprehension is to measure the proportion 
of individuals who switch from Option A to Option B more than once in a given 
price list. Such multiple switching is difficult to rationalize using standard theory 
and may indicate subject confusion. About 9.7 percent of our subjects switched 
more than once in Task 1, and 12.7 percent switched more than once in Task 2, 
while Holt and Laury (2002) document around 10 percent multiple switching from 
a standard subject pool. Another way of identifying miscomprehension is identify-
ing individuals with nonmonotonic utility functions. That is, individuals for whom 
13 The script read “We are interested in understanding how Afghans make decisions involving uncertain out-
comes and some normal risks that people face every day. We would like to ask you some hypothetical questions that 
will help us understand these decisions. There is no real money involved and you will not receive any money for 
answering these questions. Are you willing to answer these questions?”
14 For example, when describing a gamble, enumerators were told to rip ten small pieces of paper, number 
them one to ten and place them in a bag. “When discussing the (1; 150, 450) gamble against the (q; 450, 0) gam-
ble, they would describe it as follows: First we will ask you a hypothetical question over an amount for certain, 
or an amount that will be awarded depending on which of ten numbers you draw from a bag. We have deposited 
10 cards numbered 1 through 10 into a bag. You have an even chance of drawing any of the 10 numbers. The 
numbers in parentheses indicate the winning numbers. For each Option No., please indicate whether you would 
prefer Choice A or Choice B. For each Option No. there will be 10 numbers in the bag and you are only able to 
draw one. This is not for real money and we are not asking you to make a gamble, we just want to understand 
how you would respond to naturally occurring risk.”
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v(X  ) U = (q − 0.5)/0.5 < 0. Such behavior is exhibited by 12.9 percent of our 
subjects.15 87 respondents (8.9 percent of the sample completing the tasks) have 
both nonmonotonic utility functions and exhibit multiple switching on both tasks, 
consistent with miscomprehension. As these two behaviors both suggest failure to 
understand the experimental paradigm, our main analysis focuses on the 816 of 977 
individuals who completed both tasks and did not multiply switch or exhibit non-
monotonic utility. In Section IIC, we show that attrition from the sample of 977 is 
not associated with treatment.
B. Psychological Primes
Psychology has developed a series of methodologies for priming, the objective of 
which is to cue an emotional state or identification.
In a representative survey of 973 US individuals in the aftermath of September 11 
conducted by Lerner et al. (2003), one-third of subjects were randomly asked to 
recall and write down the one thing about the event that made them the most fear-
ful or anxious, one-third were asked what made them most angry, and one-third 
were asked what made them most sad. The evidence suggested that those primed 
with fear and anxiety in this way became more fearful in self-reports than the other 
groups and believed that terrorist attacks were substantially more likely.16 Given 
the documented effects and validation of the fearful recollections of trauma in both 
Lerner et al. (2003) and Lerner and Keitner (2001), we implemented small modifi-
cations of these priming mechanisms.
Just prior to completing the utility elicitation tasks one-third of subjects at ran-
dom were asked: “We are interested in understanding your daily experiences that 
may make you fearful or anxious. This could be anything, for example getting sick, 
experiencing violence, losing a job, etc. Could you describe one event in the past 
year that caused you fear or anxiety?” (FEAR)
Another third were asked: “We are interested in understanding your daily experi-
ences that make you happy or joyous. This could be anything, for example birth of 
child, marriage of a relative, or success in your job. Could you describe an event in 
the past year that caused you happiness?” (HAPPY)
And another third were asked: “We are interested in understanding your general 
daily experiences. This could be anything. Could you describe an event from the 
past year.” (NEUTRAL)
15 This classification recognizes the interval nature of the uncertainty equivalent data. As individuals are 
not allowed to express indifference, we classify utility as monotonic if an individual switches at the fifth row, 
q′ ∈ [0.4, 0.5], or higher in Task 1. Importantly, in robustness tests we document that nonmonotonicities are uncor-
related with either exposure to violence or priming. Further, the central results of Table 4 are maintained if we admit 
nonmonotonic individuals.
16 Using this method of priming, experimentally induced anger has also been validated and linked to more opti-
mistic probability judgments and risk-tolerant choices (Lerner and Keitner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003). Though prior 
validation gives some measure of confidence in the use of recollection to prime a target emotion, much more work 
is needed in this vein before firm conclusions can be drawn either about the reliability of such priming mechanisms 
or their consequent effects on decision making. For recent discussion on the need for replication in psychological 
priming studies see Yong (2012).
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Priming Protocol.—Primes were given to all individuals who agreed to the con-
sent discussed above asking individuals if they were willing to answer questions on 
their daily experiences and on risky decisions.
In order to implement the randomized psychological primes, several baseline steps 
were taken to ensure randomness and maximize statistical power. First, following 
procedures from the field experimental literature (Bruhn and McKenzie 2009), we 
stratified our assignment of primes at the polling center level. Hence, we are able 
to provide within–polling center estimates, limiting the set of plausible alternatives 
for our interacted results to those operating on a small, and precise, geographic 
scale. Second, we implemented this stratified randomization by setting a random 
seed for each polling center. That is, the prime of the first survey was randomly set, 
and then a fixed order was followed such that HAPPY followed FEAR, NEUTRAL 
followed HAPPY, and FEAR followed NEUTRAL. This fixed pattern and random 
seeding helps to alleviate potential concerns about enumerators selectively altering 
the order of primes. Additionally, interviews were time stamped with an enumerator 
self-report. Of course, this does not fully remove threats to the randomization, so we 
added a standard random monitoring campaign with supervisors present for around 
16 percent of all surveys and personally back-checking an additional 11 percent.
Table 2 reports summary statistics across the three psychological primes as well as 
t-tests of means. Note that broad balance is achieved across a variety of demograph-
ics including age, income, gender, religion, education, and marriage. Additional 
variables corresponding to social cohesion (if the government should resolve dis-
putes, the importance of reporting insurgent attacks), personal experiences with, and 
expectations of insurgent attacks are also balanced. These variables are measured 
prior to the administration of primes and so constitute pretreatment measures. One 
exception is that individuals assigned to the NEUTRAL primes do appear more 
likely to believe that police should resolve disputes.
To increase confidence that the experimental effects on risk preference we observe 
are the result of the administration of primes and do not reflect preexisting dif-
ferences, we additionally asked respondents to indicate their risk tolerance on a 
0–10 Likert scale, where zero is anchored at “unwilling to take risks” and the value 
ten means “fully prepared to take risks” at a point in the interview substantially 
before the administration of primes. Balance is achieved on this measure as well.17 
Importantly, unlike in other correlational analyses where measurements are taken 
sometime after exposure to trauma, the random primes generate a sample that is bal-
anced on both exposure to violence and the share of respondents who were born in 
the neighborhood of the survey location.
C. Violence Data
Afghanistan has suffered 30 years of violence. Following the military coup of the 
communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1978 and the subsequent 
Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghans have lived through large-scale violence, repres-
sion, civil war, and ethnic cleansing.
17 We were not able to elicit risk preference at this stage using a full price list, as we had not yet provided indi-
viduals who were unwilling to participate the option of discontinuing the survey.
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We focus our analysis on April 2002 to February 2010, a period for which we have 
precisely geocoded and timestamped data on violence. These data come from inci-
dent records of the International Security Assistance Force, a multilateral military 
body present since December 2001, obtained through the Combined Information 
Data Network Exchange.
In addition to geocodes at five–decimal digit precision (accurate to within one 
meter at the equator), these data provide the time and type of the incident. In 
effect, these data capture all types of violence reported to the International Security 
Table 2—Summary Statistics
NEUTRAL FEAR HAPPY t-test of:
prime prime prime ( p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (2)–(1) (3)–(1)
Sociodemographics
Age 29.520 29.592 28.926 0.937 0.495
(0.648) (0.648) (0.576)
Income (1,000 AFs) 12.994 12.303 12.395 0.409 0.445
(0.536) (0.648) (0.573)
Female (= 1) 0.370 0.438 0.407 0.108 0.370
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Shia (= 1) 0.157 0.140 0.130 0.578 0.368
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Education (years) 9.719 9.796 10.004 0.834 0.442
(0.259) (0.261) (0.264)
Married (= 1) 0.626 0.619 0.593 0.858 0.418
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Social cohesion and mobility
Reporting insurgent activity important 0.496 0.525 0.474 0.521 0.637
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Police resolve disputes 0.249 0.189 0.189 0.089 0.088
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Courts resolve disputes 0.135 0.174 0.178 0.215 0.170
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Respondent born locally 0.786 0.781 0.800 0.880 0.696
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Administrative violence
Violence (= 1) 0.473 0.464 0.485 0.689 0.656
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Failed violence (= 1) 0.363 0.355 0.344 0.841 0.650
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Self-reported violence
Self-reported attack (last five years) 0.242 0.223 0.233 0.594 0.812
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Expectations of future insurgent attack (0 –10) 3.491 3.438 3.544 0.818 0.820
(0.157) (0.172) (0.176)
Baseline risk
Baseline risk (0–10) 2.246 2.015 2.296 0.263 0.810
(0.142) (0.149) (0.158)
Observations 281 265 270
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Assistance Force, including incidents in which the force was not directly engaged. 
These data identify eight types of incidents: direct fire, improvised explosive device 
explosions, indirect fire, mine strikes, suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices 
found and cleared, improvised explosive device hoaxes, and mines found and 
cleared. A total of 55,063 incidents are identified during our observation window.
We separate incidents into two groups. First, we define a Successful Attack as: 
direct fire, improvised explosive device explosions, indirect fire, mine strikes, and 
suicide attacks. Second, we define an Unsuccessful Attack as: improvised explosive 
devices found and cleared, improvised explosive device hoaxes, and mines found 
and cleared. Our data contain 45,463 Successful and 9,600 Unsuccessful Attacks.
As noted above, our experimental procedures were localized around specific poll-
ing centers. Hence, we attach each incident to its nearest polling center with a one-
kilometer halo. That is, if an incident is farther than one kilometer from any polling 
center it will not be used in the analysis, and if an incident lies within one kilometer 
of two polling centers, it will be attached to the nearer of the two. For our 278 
polling centers, we are able to attach a total of 507 incidents, of which 363 were 
Successful Attacks and the remaining 144 were Unsuccessful Attacks.18 We discuss 
robustness to alternative assignment protocols in Section IIC.
As our primary measure of exposure to violence we define the indicator Violence, 
which takes the value one if there are one or more Successful Attacks attached 
to the polling center in the window of observation and zero otherwise. Roughly 
47.5  percent of our sample has Violence = 1, indicating their polling center experi-
enced a successful attack in our observation window.19
Unsuccessful Attacks provide the possibility to perform placebo tests. Under the 
assumption that the success or failure of an attack is random, then Unsuccessful 
Attacks can inform researchers as to whether it is the intention of violence or its 
realization that correlates with experimental behavior. We define the indicator Failed 
Violence, which takes the value one if there was one or more Unsuccessful Attacks 
attached to the polling center in the window of observation and zero otherwise. 
Roughly 35.4 percent of our sample has Failed Violence = 1.20
The spatial dimension of these violence measures is important for our research 
design.21 Given the density of our polling centers, locations that experienced 
Violence, Failed Violence, both events, or neither event lie geographically close. 
Figure 1 presents a map of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, with the 75 polling centers 
and their violence classifications. Violence and Failed Violence and neither of each 
are observed across the city. In the next section, we explore whether exposure to 
violence, and its recollection, correlate with experimental responses.
18 While our sample has been exposed to considerable trauma, the regions we could safely send interviewers to 
are among the safer in Afghanistan.
19 In the robustness tests of Section IIC, we consider alternate definitions of violence changing the halo distance, 
the assignment procedure linking violent episodes to multiple polling centers, and changing the observation period. 
We also consider a continuous measure of the intensity of violence.
20 Additionally, 25.7 percent of the sample has both Violence and Failed Violence equal to one.
21 Importantly, enumerators were blind to the administrative violence data, protecting against threats to the ran-
domization of primes and inaccurate recording of preferences.
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II. Results
We present results in three subsections. We begin by documenting the levels of 
v(X  ) U , v(X  ) C , and Certainty Premium and explore their relationship with experimen-
tal priming manipulations, objective measures of violence, and their  combination. 
Second, we explore alternate explanations for our obtained results. Third, we provide 
more standard robustness tests related to decision error and definitions of violence.
A. Main Results
Table 3 presents the location of switch points for the sample of 816 individuals 
with monotonic utility and unique switch points in Task 1 and Task 2. Potentially 
due to the 10 percentage point intervals used, 63 percent of subjects switch at the 
same point in both Task 1 and Task 2.22
22 This behavior is similar to that observed in the risk-preference measures employed by Tanaka, Camerer, and 
Nguyen (2010) to identify probability weighting and utility function curvature where a large number of subjects 
switched at the same point in the two tasks from which inference was made. See Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 
(2010) Figure 1 for detail. Here, as there, we attribute such behavior to preferences. Given the interval size, we 
hesitate to term such behavior an error. Importantly, neither primes nor exposure to violence predicts this behavior, 
and the results obtained in Table 4 are maintained if we examine only individuals with differing switch points. 
Note, as well, that we also don’t consider an error the behavior of having a higher switch point in Task 1 than Task 2. 
This behavior indicates a preference for a higher probability of a lower prize and so entails a violation of first-order 
Figure 1. Successful Attacks and Unsuccessful Attacks in Kabul
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Our primary objects of interest are v (150 ) U and v (150 ) C , and v (150 ) C − v (150 ) U . 
Given the interval nature of the experimental data, these values are interval coded 
based on where an individual switches from Option A to Option B in Task 1 and 
Task 2. Our analysis accounts for the interval nature of the data by conducting 
interval regressions (Stewart 1983), taking as dependent variable the interval of 
v (150 ) U , v (150 ) C , or the Certainty Premium, v (150 ) C − v (150 ) U .
23 Standard errors 
are clustered at the polling center level.
In Table 4, the three dependent variables are organized in columns, and three 
 panels are provided corresponding to analysis based on experimental priming results, 
administrative violence data, and their combination. In panel A, column 1, we pres-
ent priming results based on interval regressions of v (150 ) U on the FEAR prime and 
a constant. The HAPPY and NEUTRAL primes are grouped together in the constant 
as no significant differences were obtained between them. The estimated constant 
of 0.26 (SE = 0.01) in the absence of FEAR can be compared to the risk-neutral 
benchmark of X/Y = 150/450 = 1/3, indicating slight risk tolerance. Interestingly, 
the randomly administered FEAR significantly increases risk tolerance elicited under 
uncertainty. Individuals asked to recall a fearful episode are significantly more risk 
tolerant. Consistent with random assignment of the prime, this result is maintained in 
column 2 with the addition of the covariates summarized in Table 2.
The risk tolerance elicited under uncertainty is in contrast to the preferences elic-
ited under certainty. In Table 4, panel A, columns 3 and 4, we present results for 
v (150 ) C and note that the estimated constant in column 3 of 0.62 (0.01) indicates 
substantial risk aversion. FEAR is associated with a marginally significant increase 
in risk tolerance. However, this effect is only one-third the size of the effect of 
FEAR under uncertainty.
Taken together these data indicate a substantial positive Certainty Premium.24 
In column 5, we document an average Certainty Premium of 0.37 (0.01), 
stochastic dominance similar to the recently debated uncertainty effect (Gneezy, List, and Wu 2006; Simonsohn 
2009; Rydval et al. 2009). Importantly, several behavioral decision theory models including u–v preferences and 
some versions of Disappointment Aversion predict such violations of stochastic dominance.
23 The individual with no switch point in Task 1 is top coded at  q′ ∈ [1, 1] and therefore has a noninterval response.
24 To our knowledge, these are the first estimates of Certainty Premia from the field. To validate the measure, we 
check correlations with real economic behavior. Table A1 reports regressions of Certainty Premia on respondents’ 
self-reported economic behaviors and several demographic measures. We find that respondents who demand a 
higher Certainty Premium have higher savings balances and fail to repay loans less frequently. We also find that 
wealthier respondents have higher Certainty Premia, while older, better educated, and more risk-loving respondents 
have lower certainty premia. We thank an anonymous referee for recommending this exercise.
Table 3—Switch Points (row number)
Task 2 switch point
<4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 5 23 86  22   3
 6 38 150  35  2  1
Task 1 switch point  7  40 163 31  1
 8   1  45 88  9
 9   1 41 30 1
10  1 2
No switch   1
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 indicating that 150 Afghanis received with certainty are worth an additional 
37 percent chance of receiving 450 Afghanis relative to their value under uncer-
tainty. With US college students, Andreoni and Sprenger (2011) also document 
a sizable positive Certainty Premium. Certainty of ten US dollars was found to 
be worth an additional 15–20 percent chance of winning 30 dollars relative to its 
uncertain value. This positive Certainty Premium is at odds with both EU and 
Cumulative Prospect Theory, but consistent with models that feature a specific 
preference for certainty.
Table 4—Attacks, Primes, and Elicited Utility
v(150 ) u  v(150 ) c  v(150 ) c − v(150 ) u 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Priming results
FEAR (= 1) −0.052*** −0.068*** −0.018* −0.024** 0.034*** 0.043***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.256*** 0.071 0.622*** 0.517*** 0.367*** 0.442***
(0.011) (0.050) (0.005) (0.026) (0.009) (0.032)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 816 718 816 718 816 718
Clusters 278 267 278 267 278 267
log-likelihood −1,285.164 −1,105.430 −1,300.302 −1,123.941 −572.954 −467.789
Panel B. Administrative violence results
Violence (= 1) −0.016 −0.011 −0.004 −0.002 0.012 0.009
(0.015) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant 0.251*** 0.057 0.620*** 0.511*** 0.369*** 0.449***
(0.015) (0.052) (0.007) (0.027) (0.012) (0.033)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 816 718 816 718 816 718
Clusters 278 267 278 267 278 267
log-likelihood −1,289.216 −1,112.293 −1,302.126 −1,127.166 −577.058 −474.943
Panel C. Exposure to violence and prime sensitivity
FEAR (= 1) −0.006 −0.023 −0.001 −0.007 0.004 0.015
(0.025) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Violence (= 1) 0.015 0.019 0.007 0.009 −0.008 −0.010
(0.019) (0.022) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
FEAR × violence −0.098*** −0.096*** −0.036** −0.035* 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)
Constant 0.253*** 0.066 0.620*** 0.514*** 0.367*** 0.444***
(0.017) (0.052) (0.008) (0.027) (0.014) (0.035)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 816 718 816 718 816 718
Clusters 278 267 278 267 278 267
log-likelihood −1,280.901 −1,101.704 −1,298.191 −1,122.101 −568.666 −463.932
Notes: Estimates from interval regressions (Stewart 1983). Robust standard errors clustered at the Polling Center 
level reported in parentheses. All regressions include province fixed effects. Violence data are from ISAF CIDNE. 
Violence is defined as a violent event occurring within one kilometer of interview location over the period 
April 2002–February 2010. Sample: 816 individuals with monotonic utility and no multiple switching. v(150)C 
refers to elicited utility under certainty, while v(150)U refers to elicited utility under uncertainty. The difference 
v(150)C − v(150)U is the measured Certainty Premium. The covariates are preprime risk (0–10), female (= 1), Shia 
(= 1), years of education, born locally (= 1), reporting insurgent activity important (= 1), prefer police resolve 
disputes (= 1), prefer courts resolve disputes (= 1), married (= 1), age, and log(income).
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Table 4, panel B repeats the above analysis with the key independent variable 
being the presence of violent activity at the polling center level, Violence (= 1). 
Different results are obtained. No significant relationship between administratively 
measured violence and experimentally elicited risk preferences is observed.
In panel C of Table 4, we combine our data sources, examining the interacted 
effect of exposure to violence and being asked to recall fear-inducing episodes. 
Panel C indicates that FEAR without Violence and Violence without FEAR have 
limited effect on behavior. Individuals exposed to violence who are asked to recall 
these episodes drive the observed effects. These respondents are more risk toler-
ant under uncertainty have significantly higher Certainty Premia. Violence exposed 
individuals, primed to recall fearful episodes, have Certainty Premia six percentage 
points larger than unexposed, unprimed individuals, indicating a 16 percent greater 
willingness-to-pay (in probability units of 450 Afs) for certainty.25
While we can interpret the coefficients of FEAR and FEAR × Violence as causal 
effects on two different subsamples, we cannot argue that violence is causing the 
difference in responses to priming. Violent incidents may be correlated with some 
other critical characteristic of the polling center, such as migration flows or local 
willingness to trust military personnel. In the presence of such confounds, it is still 
the case that the causal effect of priming on risk behavior is larger for violence-
exposed individuals, but exposure may not be the reason why it is larger. We provide 
a battery of tests exploring alternative explanations for the difference in responses to 
priming in the next subsection.
B. Testing Alternative Explanations
This section reports further tests of whether the effect of violence on experimental 
behavior is mediated through recall. To begin, we exploit the stratification of experi-
mental primes at the polling center precinct level to test the sensitivity of the results 
to estimation using only within-polling center variation. Any omitted correlate of 
violence causing individuals in violent neighborhoods to exhibit more sensitivity to 
FEAR, if it is not closely spatially correlated with patterns of violence, should cause 
our estimates to be sensitive to the inclusion of polling center fixed effects. Next, 
we exploit a feature of our data which allows us to identify unsuccessful attacks in 
order to perform placebo tests. Last, we directly examine a remaining set of plau-
sible omitted correlates, such as migration, willingness to report attacks to military 
forces, and willingness to use the Afghan government to adjudicate disputes. These 
results add further support to the findings above.
Within–Polling Center Variation.—As a first consistency test, we present Table 5, 
which corresponds to panels A and C of Table 4.26 All regressions in Table 4 were 
25 Further, we find that primed, exposed individuals have Certainty Premia that are 5.7 percentage points 
( χ 2 = 20.83,  p < 0.01) larger than primed, unexposed individuals and 6.9 percentage points larger ( χ 2 = 10.21, 
p < 0.01) than unprimed, exposed individuals.  χ 2 values correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the coef-
ficients of FEAR and FEAR × Violence (= 1) are equal in panel C, column 5, and that the coefficients of Violence 
and FEAR × Violence (= 1) are equal in panel C, column 5, respectively.
26 As Violence is measured at the polling center precinct level, we cannot repeat the analysis in panel B of Table 
4 as the fixed effects are perfectly collinear with Violence. Additionally, when estimating the relation between 
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estimated using within-province variation. As described in Section IB, we strati-
fied the assignment of primes at the polling center level, which permits estimation 
of experimental effects using only within–polling center variation. Table 5 repeats 
specifications from panels A and C of Table 4 adding polling center fixed effects.27 
If potential confounds that prevent interpreting the interaction terms as causal are 
not perfectly spatially correlated with violent incidents, then they should be sensitive 
to estimation using variation at a finer degree of spatial granularity. The results are 
robust to exploiting only within–polling center variation and, in places, the results 
grow more significant consistent with spatial stratification permitting the detection 
of smaller effects.
Placebo Tests of Failed Violence.—Our data allow us to identify unsuccessful attacks. 
These data serve two purposes. First, under the assumption that conditional on intent 
success is random, this provides a placebo test indicating whether it is the intention of 
Violence × FEAR on Certainty Preference, Violence would be collinear with the polling center fixed effects and so 
is removed from regression.
27 As argued by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), this approach is likely to provide a high-powered test of the effect 
of the prime because it relies on comparisons between individuals living in the same neighborhood. Because of this, 
it is also less likely that the result is due to chance.
Table 5—Attacks, Primes, and Elicited Utility
v(150 ) u  v(150 ) c  v(150 ) c − v(150 ) u 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Priming results
FEAR (= 1) −0.059*** −0.077*** −0.020** −0.030*** 0.037*** 0.047***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.320*** 0.029 0.624*** 0.507*** 0.305*** 0.463***
(0.084) (0.111) (0.043) (0.057) (0.051) (0.066)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 816 718 816 718 816 718
log-likelihood −1,173.515 −985.089 −1,193.460 −1,005.554 −423.597 −317.696
Panel B. Exposure to violence and prime sensitivity
FEAR (= 1) −0.017 −0.037 −0.007 −0.016 0.012 0.023
(0.025) (0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
FEAR × Violence −0.083** −0.079** −0.027 −0.026 0.050** 0.047**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant 0.333*** 0.051 0.628*** 0.514*** 0.298*** 0.450***
(0.084) (0.111) (0.043) (0.057) (0.052) (0.066)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 816 718 816 718 816 718
log-likelihood −1,170.730 −982.717 −1,192.323 −1,004.462 −420.812 −315.263
Notes: Estimates from interval regressions (Stewart 1983). Standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include Polling Center fixed effects. There are 278 polling centers in our sample. We do not include Violence in panel 
B as it is measured at the polling center level and so is perfectly collinear with the polling center fixed effects. Violence 
data are from ISAF CIDNE. Violence is defined as a violent event occurring within one kilometer of interview location 
over the period April 2002–February 2010. Sample: 816 individuals with monotonic utility and no multiple switching. 
v(150)C refers to elicited utility under certainty, while v(150)U refers to elicited utility under uncertainty. The differ-
ence v(150)C − v(150)U is the measured Certainty Premium. The covariates are preprime risk (0–10), female (= 1), 
Shia (= 1), years of education, born locally (= 1), reporting insurgent activity important (= 1), prefer police resolve 
disputes (= 1), prefer courts resolve disputes (= 1), married (= 1), age, and log(income).
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violence or its realization that has an impact on observed behavior. Second, these data 
allow for a restriction of plausible confounds. If the omitted correlate of violence which 
is driving vulnerability to primes is also correlated with the intention to attack, then we 
should find differential vulnerability to primes based on unsuccessful attacks as well.
Table 6 reports placebo tests regressing Certainty Premium on the full set of inter-
actions for Violence and Failed Violence, separated by FEAR.28 Consistent with 
violence causing decision making to be vulnerable to fearful recollections, it is 
Violence alone and not Failed Violence or the interaction that is correlated with 
Certainty Premium in the FEAR condition. Not only does this suggest that it is the 
realization of traumatic episodes that provides the basis for fearful recollection, but 
also it narrows the set of potential confounds to correlates of realized violent activity 
that are not highly correlated with failed attacks.
Measures of Social Cohesion and Selective Migration.—A set of possible alternative 
explanations remains. It may be that successful attacks drive migration while planned 
attacks do not, and that individuals whose preferences are responsive to recall do not 
migrate. It may be that individuals who are susceptible to primes are less likely to report 
attacks, and so disproportionately live in neighborhoods where attacks succeed. It may 
be that individuals who are susceptible to primes disproportionately live in areas that 
are not under government control, and it is in these areas that attacks are more common.
28 Of course, data limitations may restrict detecting an effect due to a limited sample size.
Table 6—Placebo Tests Using Failed Violence
Certainty premium: v(150 ) C − v(150 ) U 
FEAR (= 1) FEAR (= 0)
Sample: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violence (= 1) 0.066*** 0.054*** 0.053** −0.008 −0.007 −0.003
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Failed violence (= 1) 0.001 −0.021 −0.023 −0.014 −0.012 0.010
(0.019) (0.030) (0.030) (0.016) (0.030) (0.026)
Violence × failed 0.036 0.035 −0.003 −0.029
 violence (0.038) (0.040) (0.032) (0.030)
Constant 0.363*** 0.367*** 0.428*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.450***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.054) (0.018) (0.020) (0.045)
Covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 265 265 238 551 551 480
Clusters 196 196 181 258 258 239
log-likelihood −171.215 −170.830 −141.457 −391.627 −391.621 −314.615
Notes: Estimates from interval regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the Polling Center level reported 
in parentheses. All regressions include province fixed effects. Violence data are from ISAF CIDNE. Violence is 
defined as a violent event occurring within one kilometer of interview location over the period April 2002–February 
2010. Sample: 816 individuals with monotonic utility and no multiple switching. The difference v(150 ) C − v(150 ) U 
is the measured Certainty Premium. The covariates are preprime risk (0–10), female (= 1), Shia (= 1), years of 
education, born locally (= 1), reporting insurgent activity important (= 1), prefer police resolve disputes (= 1), 
prefer courts resolve disputes (= 1), married (= 1), age, and log(income).
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All three potential confounds share the feature that individuals selectively migrate 
or settle depending on violence, so the insensitivity of the results to the inclusion 
of polling center fixed effects reported in Table 5 already provides some evidence 
against their relevance. Importantly, our data provide additional opportunities to 
test these hypotheses as we are able to measure social cohesion, the importance of 
reporting attacks, and migration.
In Table 7, we provide tests of these competing accounts. In regressions of 
Certainty Premium, we sequentially interact FEAR both with Violence and can-
didate omitted variables including whether individuals feel that reporting a terror 
attack is important, whether they use the formal police or court system to resolve 
disputes, and whether they were born in the neighborhood of the survey.29 The coef-
ficient on the interaction between Violence and FEAR remains strongly significant, 
and the magnitude is virtually unchanged, suggesting that the effect of FEAR is 
different according to exposure to violence and not according to these confounds.
The tests to here remain consistent with the conclusion that violent exposure cre-
ates a triggerability in decision making of traumatic recollections. The results are 
retained when relying on within–polling center variation, find support in placebo 
tests employing Failed Violence, and are robust to potential alternative stories rely-
ing on selective migration and settlement. In the following section, we consider 
more traditional robustness tests.
C. Robustness Tests
This section addresses three additional concerns for the main results reported in 
Table 4. First, it may be that results hinge on this particular definition of Violence. 
We test the robustness of our results to measuring the intensity of violence, chang-
ing the catchment area halo from 0.5 km to 3 km, allowing violent episodes to be 
linked to multiple polling centers, and changing vintages of violence. Second, the 
recollection of fearful episodes may be mentally taxing and so cause respondents to 
respond erratically in the experiment. Third, it may be that, because the FEAR prime 
raises a sensitive and uncomfortable issue, more risk-averse respondents select to 
discontinue participation, driving the result. We test each of these concerns in turn.
Definition and Vintage of Violence.—So far, we have measured violence as whether 
or not an attack occurred in our observation window. To investigate the importance 
of violence intensity, we construct a normalized violence intensity measure as the 
number of local attacks divided by 56, which is the maximum number of attacks in 
any polling center in our sample. Online Appendix Table A2, panel A repeats the 
estimations of Table 4 replacing the Violence dummy with our violence intensity 
measure. As in Table 4, for more severely exposed individuals fearful recollections 
increase Certainty Premia.
Online Appendix Table A2, panel B separates violence by time period, April 2002 
to September 2005, October 2005 to December 2007, and January 2008 to February 
29 Note that one of these questions, whether reporting insurgent activity is important, appeared to be particularly 
sensitive as 98 of 816 subjects declined to answer. Unlike the other tables of results where the covariate list is com-
plete, Table 7 omits the other social cohesion variables when estimating.
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2010. The data indicate the effects of violence and fearful recollection are concen-
trated on more recent exposure.
A final concern may be that our results depend on our decision to code Violence 
based on events within one kilometer of the nearest polling center. Online Appendix 
Table A3 examines additional ways of assigning violence to the polling center. In panel 
A, we consider varying definitions of the catchment area to include events occurring 
within 0.5-, one-, and three-kilometer halos, respectively. The results remain robust 
across distance definitions. In unreported results, we find that the correlations break 
down once we expand the halo radius to five kilometers, a distance that could intro-
duce substantial measurement error. In panel B, we assign events to all polling cen-
ters within the catchment area, not simply the closest, and examine events occurring 
within 0.5-, 1-, and 3-kilometer halos, respectively. We find that at 0.5 km the results 
are robust to this multiple assignment. As the distance grows,  significance is lost. 
For larger distances, there is little variation in the independent violence measure (e.g., 
in column 6 of panel B, 89.8 percent of the sample has Violence (3km) equal to one).
Table 7—Social Cohesion and Selective Migration
 v(150 ) c − v(150 ) u 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FEAR (= 1) 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.010 −0.023 −0.021
(0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)
Violence (= 1) −0.010 −0.010 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
FEAR × violence 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.059***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Report. ins. −0.008 −0.008
 act. imp. (0.013) (0.013)
Police solve 0.014 0.013
 disputes (= 1) (0.015) (0.015)
Court solve 0.005 0.009
 disputes (= 1) (0.018) (0.018)
Born locally (= 1) −0.026 −0.022
(0.018) (0.017)
FEAR × report 0.000 −0.003
(0.021) (0.020)
FEAR × police −0.018 −0.012
(0.029) (0.028)
FEAR × court −0.015 −0.018
(0.031) (0.031)
FEAR × local 0.034 0.034
(0.028) (0.028)
Constant 0.367*** 0.440*** 0.365*** 0.421*** 0.367*** 0.425*** 0.386*** 0.439***
(0.015) (0.031) (0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.031) (0.020) (0.035)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed effects Prov. Prov. Prov. Prov. Prov. Prov. Prov. Prov.
Observations 718 718 816 816 816 816 816 816
Clusters 267 267 278 278 278 278 278 278
log-likelihood −474.679 −464.557 −568.243 −558.992 −568.530 −559.183 −567.209 −558.193
Notes: Estimates from interval regressions (Stewart 1983). Robust standard errors clustered at the Polling Center 
level reported in parentheses. All regressions include province fixed effects. Violence data are from ISAF CIDNE. 
Violence is defined as a violent event occurring within one kilometer of interview location over the period April 
2002–February 2010. Sample: 816 individuals with monotonic utility and no multiple switching. The difference 
v(150)C − v(150)U is the measured Certainty Premium. The covariates are preprime risk (0–10), female (= 1), Shia 
(= 1), years of education, married (= 1), age, and log(income).
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Decision Error.—Recalling a violent episode may be cognitively difficult and so 
drive respondents to systematically misunderstand the choice tasks used to elicit risk 
preferences. This problem may be particularly salient in Afghanistan, where literacy, 
especially for women, is among the lowest in the world.30 We analyze two possible 
indicators for miscomprehension, multiple switching and exhibiting nonmonotonic 
utility. Columns 1– 4 of online Appendix Table A4 report results from regressions of 
an indicator variable equal to one for respondents switching multiple times in either 
choice Task 1 or 2 on FEAR and FEAR interacted with Violence. Columns 5–8 repeat 
columns 1–4 replacing the dependent variable with an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
respondents exhibiting nonmonotonic utility. We find no significant differences in deci-
sion error according to treatment status in any specification. However, with only about 
10 percent of respondents exhibiting such errors, these tests may be underpowered.
Attrition.—Of the 1,127 respondents who consented to questioning about risk, 
144 (12.7 percent) did not complete the first task in the protocol and an additional 
six respondents failed to complete the second task. This poses a problem for our 
result if the attrition is systematically linked to the prime since we would be measur-
ing different portions of the primed and unprimed sample. Table A5 demonstrates 
that attrition is not systematically linked to priming by regressing an indicator for 
attrition on FEAR, Violence, and their interaction.
III. Discussion and Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that individuals exposed to violence, when primed to 
recall fear, exhibit an increased preference for certainty. Understanding the channels 
by which these effects manifest is a key challenge. Though a full understanding of 
mechanisms lies beyond our data, we discuss three sets of results which may high-
light potential avenues of operation and spur future research.
First, our robustness tests already suggest an operative role for the intensity and 
vintage of violence. More intense and more recent exposure to violence are more 
likely to generate a triggerability in risk preference. Beyond these disaggrega-
tions, we can also separate the data by the type of violent episode. Such analysis 
shows that plausibly more impactful episodes, such as improvised explosive device 
 explosions and mine strikes, lead to greater priming effects than small arms fire.31 
If the intensity, recency and impact of exposure all yield greater effects of priming, 
then researchers may be able to forecast based on these channels who will and will 
not be susceptible.
Second, our findings to here have revolved around administrative records mea-
suring violence at the neighborhood level. Though administrative records such as 
ours are valuable for their precision, they cannot speak to specifically personal 
30 According to year 2000 estimates the CIA World Factbook, 43.1 percent of males, 12.6 percent of females, 
and 28.1 percent of the total population over 15 can read and write. An earlier survey in our sample of polling cen-
ters indicate that 30.3 percent of male respondents and 23.21 of female respondents are literate.
31 See Table A6 for detail. One critical drawback of our data is we do not have access to casualty statistics, which 
would allow for a direct measure of the potential impact of a given attack. Improvised explosive device strikes tend 
to result in higher civilian casualties than direct fire attacks because they do not target government forces precisely 
(Berman et al. 2011).
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experience. In our survey individuals were asked whether they had experienced an 
insurgent attack. Twenty-three percent of our 816 subjects, balanced across primes, 
report positively regarding the last five years.32 When conducting our core anal-
ysis based on these self-reported measures, broadly similar, though less precise, 
results are obtained.33 Though comparisons of effect sizes across measures with 
different degrees of error would be imprudent, these results indicate that personal 
self-reported experience, per se, does not yield larger effects than administratively 
measured neighborhood violence.
Third, one potential avenue of operation is expectations of violence. Individuals’ 
expectations may change due to recollection, potentially leading to increased cer-
tainty premia. As we measure expectations of violence prior to the prime, we can 
only indirectly test this avenue. Consistent with this channel, we find that respon-
dents living in violent neighborhoods believe that violence is more likely.34 However 
expectations have only limited correlation with measured certainty premia. Further, 
when we examine our core treatment effects separated by levels of expectation, we 
find insignificant results.35 A more convincing test of expectations as the operative 
channel requires measuring the response of both expectations and risk preferences 
to primes among violence-affected populations.
Our findings on intensity and recency of experience suggest operative channels based 
on the salience of events. However, a clear gap between the present research and a full 
understanding of mechanisms is why fearful recollections should lead to increased cer-
tainty premia in the first place. An intuition generated from psychology is provided by 
Lerner and Keitner (2001), who note “the sense of uncertainty and lack of control asso-
ciated with fear should lead fearful individuals to make risk-averse (certainty enhanc-
ing) choices.” Fear-induced individuals may exhibit a preference for certainty to exert 
control. Focusing on control seems an important avenue for understanding violence, 
risk, and certainty preferences. In addition to the apparent links between fear, control, 
and risk attitudes (Lerner and Keitner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003), evidence from trauma-
affected individuals such as combat veterans indicate key relationships between experi-
enced violence, perceived loci of control and stress disorders (Casella and Motta 1990; 
Frye and Stockton 1982; Hyer et al. 1987; Solomon, Mikulincer, and Benbenishty 
1989; Solomon and Mikulincer 1990; Solomon, Mikulincer, and Avitzur 1988).
We note two implications of our results. First, prior correlational studies carry 
with them the implication that individual risk preferences are potentially lastingly 
altered. Our work demonstrates the importance of both recency of violence and of 
recollections. Individuals with violent exposure may be changed for a period of 
time, but what changes is not necessarily their risk preferences, but rather the sus-
ceptibility of their behavior to fearful recollections.
32 Self-reports of violence show some signs of underreporting, consistent with clinical view of reluctance to 
discuss violent episodes as a symptom of PTSD (Yehuda 2002). To provide a sense, 34 percent of respondents liv-
ing in neighborhoods with an ISAF record of violence report no attack, while only 9 percent of respondents with no 
ISAF record of violence report an attack. While underreporting is only one potential explanation for this difference, 
it is statistically significant ( p < 0.01).
33 See online Appendix Table A7 for detail.
34 Respondents living in violent neighborhoods have forecasts which are 0.28 standard deviations higher than 
those in non-violent neighborhoods ( p < 0.05).
35 Given our small sample size, we have limited power to test for effects by subgroups within the violence-
affected sample.
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Second, if fearful recollections trigger a specific profile of behavior, then our 
results point to the actionability of recall mechanisms. Marketers, policymakers, 
and others interacting with trauma-affected individuals may be able to trigger spe-
cific behaviors. As our observed behavior indicates individuals being willing to pay 
incrementally more for certainty when triggered, one can imagine close analogs 
in financial decision making such as insurance purchasing and portfolio choice. 
Trauma-affected individuals are known to have broadly worse economic outcomes, 
and so future research should explore triggering mechanisms that may generate such 
phenomena and policy interventions that may reduce negative outcomes.
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Datasets 
 
When referencing datasets, please include the author name or the name of the provider hosting the data, the year the 
data were collected or posted, the name or title of the dataset, the name of the database if applicable, and any other 
information necessary for one to retrieve the data. Please include the date accessed in parentheses at the end. 
Example 1: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2000–2010. “Current Employment Statistics: Colorado, Total Nonfarm, 
Seasonally adjusted - SMS08000000000000001.” United States Department of Labor. http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/surveymost?sm+08 (accessed February 9, 2011). 
Example 2: Leiss, Amelia. 1999. “Arms Transfers to Developing Countries, 1945–1968.” Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI. ICPSR05404-v1. doi:10.3886/ICPSR05404 (accessed 
February 8, 2011). 
 
For references to data specifically associated with a published paper, please include the author Name(s). Year. 
“Paper title: Dataset.” Journal Name. Location of the data. 
 
Example 3: Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2010. “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: 
Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks: Dataset.” American Economic Review. 
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.763 (accessed February 9, 2011). 
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